Based on the 'ping-pong' quantum communication protocol proposed by Bostr .. om and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)], we show a deterministic secure direct communication protocol using single qubit in mixed state. This single qubit protocol is an asymptotically secure key distribution. It can be realized with today's technology. In principle, even if the single qubit source is not perfect, this protocol is also secure.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a protocol which is provably secure. Eve cannot gain any information from the qubits transmitted from Alice to Bob without disturbing their state. First , the no-cloning theorem forbids Eve to perfectly clone Alice's qubit. Second, in any attempt to distinguish between two non-orthogonal quantum states, information gain is only possible at the expense of introducing disturbance to the signal [1] .
Based on the postulate of quantum measurement [2] and no-cloning theorem [3] , different QKD protocols are presented [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . However, these types of cryptographic schemes are usually nondeterministic. Recently, K. Bostrom and T. Felbinger presented a protocol, which allows for deterministic communication using entanglement [9] . Cai presented an protocol which allows for deterministic communication using a single qubit which is prepared in mixed state [10] . In this paper, we show a novel protocol which is a deterministic secure direct communication protocol using single qubit in mixed state. Surprisingly, even Alice sends two or more qubits which are prepared in the same state to Bob every time, this protocol is also secure.
It is well known that we can prepare a photon in states {|0 >, |1 >} or {|ϕ 0 >, |ϕ 1 >}in its polarization degree of freedom, where
Denote that iσ y = |0 >< 1| − |1 >< 0|, it can be obtained:
Suppose Alice want to obtain some classical information from Bob. First she sends one qubit which is prepared in a mixed state |ψ >:
to Bob. That is, Alice selects state |0 > or |ϕ + > randomly with the probability p = 1 2 every time. Bob decides either to perform the operation iσ y on the travel qubit to encode the information '1' or do nothing, i.e., to perform the operation I = |0 >< 0| + |1 >< 1| to encode the information '0'. Then Bob sends the travel qubit back to Alice. Alice performs a measurement on this back qubit to draw the information Bob encoded. This is a ping − pong protocol [9] . In this protocol, there are two communication modes, 'message mode' and 'control mode' (see Figs.1  and 2 ). By default, Bob and Alice are in message mode. The communication is described as above. With probability c, Bob switches the message mode to control mode. After Bob obtained a photon, instead of performing his operation on the travel qubit, Bob uses the public channel to exchanges information about the basis Alice used. Then Bob performs a measurement in the basis B 0 = {|0 >, |1 >} or B 1 = {|ϕ 0 >, |ϕ 1 >} by the information Alice told. Bob sends the measurement result to Alice. If Alice find the measurement result is the same as she prepared, she let the communication continue. Else, there is an Eve in line. The communication stops! This protocol can be described explicitly like this:
(1). Alice prepares one qubit in state |0 > or |ϕ 0 > randomly with record.
(2). Alice sends this qubit to Bob. (4m). Bob performs an operation on the travel qubit to encode classical information. He encodes the bit '0' using by the operation I and the bit '1' by the operation iσ y . Then Bob sends this travel qubit back to Alice. Alice measures the qubit to draw the information Bob encoded.
(5). When all of Bob's information is transmitted, this communication is successfully terminated. We will show that this protocol is secure. And this protocol is still secure even Alice sends two or more qubit which are prepared in the same state to Bob every time.
First, we will show that this protocol is secure when Alice sends one qubit every time. To obtain the information about which operation Alice performs, Eve can uses any technology that laws of quantum mechanics permit [11] . The most general quantum operation is a completely positive map
Because of the Stinespring dilation theorem [12] , and completely positive map can be realized by a unitary operation on a larger Hilbert space. If the H A has a Hilbert space of d dimensions, then it suffices to model the ancilla space H E as being in a Hilbert space of no more than d 2 dimensions. With an ancilla state |e >∈ H E , and a unitary operation
In order to gain information about Bob's operation, Eve should first perform the unitary attack operation U on the composed system, then let Bob perform his coding operation on the travel photon, and finally perform a measurement (see Fig. 3 ). Without loss of generality, we may assume |φ 0 > and |φ 1 > (instead of |0 > and |ϕ 0 >) are the nonorthogonal states that Eve is trying to obtain information about. The process she uses to attack travel qubit is to unitarily interact the state (|φ 0 > or |φ 1 >) with an ancilla prepared in a standard state |u >. Assuming that this process does not disturb the states, in the two cases one obtains
Eve would like |v > and |v ′ > to be different so that she can acquire information about the identity of the state. However, Taking the inner product of these two equations gives
which implies that |v > and |v ′ > must be identical. Thus, we know that any mark on the travel qubit would disturb the states. Bob can find out Eve is in line by measurement in the control mode. Suppose that Eve does not disturb the states Alice sends to Bob. The standard state |u > of the ancilla does not change. Since Bob only performs unitary operation on the travel qubit under message mode and the Von Neumann entropy does not change under the unitary operation, we know that no information exchanges between the travel qubit and ancilla. This tell us Eve cannot get any information about Bob's operation if she does not disturb the state of the travel qubit. In the other worlds, if Eve want to gain some information about Bob's operation, she must disturb the states Alice send to Bob. Then Bob has some nonzero probability to find out Eve is in line in control mode.
Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for first time by Bennett, et al [13] . Since then, single photon source have been studied in recent years and a great variety of approaches has been proposed and implemented [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Today, several groups have shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory. In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement QC. In practice, all implementations have relied on photons. The reason is that their decoherence can be controlled and moderated. Optical quantum cryptography is based on the use of single photon Fock states. Practical implementation rely on faint laser or entangled photon pairs, in which both the photon and the photon-pair number distribution obey Poisson statistics. The probability of finding n photons in such a coherent state follows the Poisson statistics:
The probability that a nonempty weak coherent pulse contains more than one photon:
can be made arbitrarily small. However, when µ is small, most pulses are empty: P (n = 0) ≈ 1 − µ. The bit rate decreases. When using weak pulses, it seems unavoidable that all the photons in a pulse carry the same qubit. The attack can take advantage of pulses containing more than one photon [20] . This drawback does not exist when using this single qubit ping-pong protocol. Consider that Alice simultaneously sends two (or more) photons to Bob one time. We can assume that these photon are prepared in the same state
No matter how many photons Alice sends, Bob performs his operation only on one photon and sends it back to Alice. The others would be discarded. Eve can intercept and capture some photons with zero probability to be detected. However, Eve's purpose is to find out which operation Bob performs. Her attack is effective only on the photon Bob performs operation on. To find out which operation Bob performs, she has to attack the photon Bob performs operation on. We know that Bob can find out Eve is in line through Eve's any attack. So even Alice sends two or more photons to Bob every time, this protocol is also secure. We have shown that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. If the single photon source is not perfect, this protocol can be described like this: 1: Alice prepares one qubit in state |0 > or |ϕ 0 > randomly with record. 2: Alice sends the qubit to Bob. 3: Bob receives the travel qubit. First, Bob has to judge how many qubit Alice sends this time. If Alice sends more than one qubits to Bob this time, he must select one of them and discard the others. Then, with probability c, he switches to control mode and proceeds with 4c, else he proceeds with 4m.
4c: Bob sends one bit to Alice through public channel about control mode. Alice sends one bit back to Bob through public channel to tell Bob which basis she used. Then Bob measures the travel qubit on the basis Alice told. Bob tells the result of the measurement to Alice through public channel. If the result Bob told is different to Alice's record, Alice know there is an Eve in line. This communication stops. Else, this communication continues.
4m: Bob performs an operation on one qubit to encode classical information. He encodes the bit '0' using by the operation I and the bit '1' by the operation iσ y . Then Bob sends this qubit back to Alice. Alice measures the qubit to draw the information Bob encoded.
5: When all of Bob's information transmitted, this communication successfully terminated. To gain Bob's information I > 0, Eve has to face a detection probability d > 0. Taking into account the probability c of a control run, the effective transmission rate is r = 1 − c. The probability of Eve's eavesdropping one message transfer without being detected is [9] 
After n bits, it becomes
For c > 0, d > 0, this value decreases exponentially. In summary, we show an modified 'ping − pong' protocol in this paper. We use single qubit source instead of EPR pair source. We find it has a novel property that it does not need a perfect single qubit source. Considered the experimental feasibility, it needs a single photon source and some linear optical elements and an single-photon detection. It can be realized with today's technology [21] [22] . 
